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Abstract
Can tax policy foster the creation of new companies? To answer this question, we
assemble a novel country-industry level panel database with data on entry (by incor-
poration) for 17 European countries between 1997 and 2004. Our analysis is based
on recent models of how corporate taxation affects firm’s incorporation decision, We
compute effective average tax rates and study how the taxation of corporate income
affects entry rates at the country-industry level. Drawing on the political economy
literature, we account for the possible endogeneity of taxation. We find a significant
negative effect of corporate income taxation on entry rates. The effect is concave and
suggests that tax reductions affect entry rates only below a certain threshold tax level.
We also find that a reduction in corporate tax rates is more effective in countries with
better institutional infrastructure. Our results are robust to alternative measures of
effective taxation and to the use of alternative and additional explanatory variables.
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1 Introduction
The creation of new companies by entrepreneurs who seek to profit from exploiting busi-
ness opportunities is a fundamental force for economic growth. This process, first identi-
fied by Schumpeter (1911, 1942) and formalized by Aghion and Howitt (1992), has been
documented since Hause and du Rietz (1984).
Economic policies aimed at fostering the entry of new companies are high on many
governments’ agenda for their potential benefits for innovation, competition, employment,
and growth (see Aghion and Howitt (2006)). Several recent studies have looked at this
issue from a variety of angles, exploiting the increasing availability of firm-level data to
assess the impact of different economic policies on entry and economic activity.1 This
literature focuses on the effects of labor, credit, and product market regulations on entry
and on the characteristics of entrants and incumbents.
We fill a clear gap in this literature by looking at a policy instrument that has received
surprisingly little attention so far: corporate income taxation. Taxation is a flexible policy
instrument as it can be modified relatively easily in the budget law. It is also easier to
change tax rates than to embark in a structural reform of labor or product markets,
both in terms of legislative approval and of bureaucratic implementation. Moreover, tax
reductions can provide substantial monetary benefits that may have a material effect on
entrepreneurial decisions.
Our study is motivated by the theoretical model of Cullen and Gordon (2007), who
suggest that corporate income taxation affects the incorporation decision through three
(potentially countervailing) channels, whose net outcome is not a priori clear, neither in
terms of size nor in terms of functional form. Moreover, theoretical models that account
for strategic and general equilibrium effects also suggests that the taxation of corporate
income should deter entry. We then build our effective corporate income tax measures
using the methodology of Devereux and Griffith (1998a,b). We study the effect of corporate
taxation on entry rates in a panel data setting, exploiting the longitudinal variation in
the data and controlling for other time-varying institutional and regulatory factors. Our
approach allows to overcome the well-known weaknesses of purely cross-sectional studies,
thus providing a more solid foundation to our conclusions.
An important and novel contribution of this paper is that we consider that taxation
is unlikely to be an exogenous policy instrument, but that it rather reacts to current
(or past) business conditions. We account for this source of endogeneity by using several
instrumental variables borrowed by the political economy literature (see Pagano and Volpin
1See Aghion et al. (2009), Alesina et al. (2005), Bertrand and Kramarz (2002), Bertrand, Schoar, and
Thesmar (2007), Giannetti and Ongena (2009), Griffith, Harrison and Macartney (2007), Nicoletti and
Scarpetta (2003).
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(2005)). While some recent studies include taxation as a determinant of the incorporation
decision (see Barrios et. al (2008), Djankov et al. (2008), and Klapper, Laeven, and
Rajan (2006)), to the best of our knowledge our study is the first to take into account the
endogeneity of tax policy in this context. Moreover, we consider that the entry decision
is likely to be influenced not only by taxation but also by other policy measures. For this
purpose, we include in the analysis a summary measure of other economic policies which
are likely to influence the creation of new businesses, and we consider that this, too, is
potentially endogenous.
Our empirical investigation therefore advances in several dimension the recent strand
of purely cross-country studies that study the effect of policy measures and country char-
acteristics on the incorporation decision and on the characteristics of entrants (see Ciccone
and Papaioannou (2007), Demirgüç-Kunt, Love, and Maksimovic (2006), Desai, Gompers,
and Lerner (2006), Djankov et al. (2002), Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006), and Perotti
and Volpin (2007)). In particular, a concurrent study by Djankov et al. (2008) analyzes a
cross-section of 85 countries. They use survey-based information to build the tax burden
of a ‘standard’ company with similar characteristics across all countries (the company
produces and sells flower pots). This approach allows a direct comparison of the tax bur-
den across countries using the ‘effective’ tax rate which applies to the chosen ‘standard’
company. However, it also limits the generality of the results, since the behavior of the
‘standard’ company may not be representative of a country’s businesses. They find that
the average entry rate over the years 2000 to 2005 is negatively affected by an increase
in the 2004 corporate tax rate. Measured at the mean, a 10 percentage point decrease
in the effective corporate tax rate is associated with an increase in the entry rate of 1.4
percentage points, compared to an average entry rate of 8 percent.
We develop our analysis assembling a novel firm-level panel dataset which covers 17
West European countries in the period between 1997 and 2004. The dataset is derived
from the Amadeus database published by Bureau van Dijk, which contains data on over 9
million European companies and has already been studied by Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan
(2006) in the context of entry regulation. These data allow us to measure in a precise,
consistent way, the entry of incorporated firms in 17 European countries for each of the 8
sample years. In particular, the data allow us to build measures at the country-industry-
year level, thus bringing the analysis to a more disaggregate level than most previous
studies.
Europe offers a particularly interesting testing ground, both for the quality of these
data and for the fact that relatively similar economies have experienced a diversity of tax
and other economic policies over the last decade. Several European countries reduced
statutory tax rates during the last decade, while at the same time also changing the
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effective tax base, creating a variety of situations which we exploit econometrically.
We measure the effective average corporate tax rate using detailed yearly information
for each country from Ernst&Young, a major multinational tax consultancy. Building on
Devereux and Griffith (1998a), we account for the effects of corporate taxation at the local
level, for alternative capital structures of entering firms, for personal taxation, and also
for alternative measures of the tax burden, thus measuring taxation in a more precise way
than previous studies.
What do the data tell about the effect of corporate taxation on entry? There is strong
evidence that corporate taxation has indeed an effect on entry rates that is statistically
significant and economically relevant. This evidence is consistently robust across a variety
of specifications. Two results stand out. One is the evidence supporting a non-linear
relation. This suggests that the effect of a tax reduction is at work only below a given
initial threshold tax level. The effect is economically non-negligible. In our preferred
specification, a reduction of the corporate tax rate from the median (30.08%) to the first
quartile (27.57%) implies a 0.880 percentage point increase in the entry rate. We interpret
this result on the basis of Cullen and Gordon (2007). They identify two distinct channels
through which lower corporate taxation should increase entry by incorporation (through
"income shifting" from personal to corporate taxation, and through "risk subsidy" to
entrepreneurial activity), and one channel that has the opposite effect (through "risk-
sharing" with the government). As we explain in Section 2, there are good reasons why
the first two channels should have a stronger effect at lower levels of taxation, while
the "risk-sharing" should have more effect (of opposite sign) at higher levels. A second
intriguing result is that a reduction of the effective corporate tax rate is more effective in
countries with a good institutional infrastructure, which we measure with the quality of
accounting standards since these determine the extent to which profits can be hidden from
taxation. On the whole, these findings point to the importance of corporate taxation for
the creation of new successful businesses, and the need for including tax policy measures
in future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a conceptual frame-
work. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 computes the entry rates. Section 5 computes
effective tax rates. Section 6 presents our results and is followed by a brief conclusion.
2 Theoretical Framework
This Section provides a simple theoretical framework to motivate our analysis and help
interpret our results. The framework is based on some well known contributions to the
literature that fit well our empirical framework. We focus on two issues. First, we want to
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identify the channels through which the taxation of corporate income is likely to affect the
entry decision, so as to guide our empirical modelling. Second, we want to put our results
in context and consider how entry might affect industry structure; while these general
equilibrium effects are not part of our empirical analysis, their consideration helps put the
implications of our results for public policy in context.
The recent model by Cullen and Gordon (2007) motivates and guides our analysis by
providing a unified framework for studying how taxation affects the incorporation deci-
sion, based on previous seminal contributions. In particular, their model identifies three
channels through which corporate income taxation affects the entry (by incorporation)
decision, on the basis that entrepreneurs can choose whether to incorporate or not their
new business. While one might expect a higher corporate income tax to discourage incor-
poration across the board, the model shows that the effects of these three channels are
potentially countervailing, so that their net outcome is not obvious.2
First, corporate income taxation often entails a lower tax rate than personal income
taxation. This creates an "income shifting" effect that may encourage entry by incorpo-
ration when expected income from a new business is sufficiently high. We also notice that
entrepreneurial risk-taking is likely to result in losses in the short-term; therefore–though
Gordon and Cullen do not include this aspect in their article–"income shifting" is partic-
ularly beneficial when loss carry-forward provisions allow incorporated businesses to offset
future profits with current losses.
Second, the progressivity of personal income tax rates creates a "risk subsidy" to entry
by incorporation. Such subsidy depends on how exactly personal and corporate taxation
are structured.
Third, when financial market imperfections prevent risk-sharing with investors, cor-
porate income taxation allows sharing entrepreneurial risk with the government. Higher
corporate income taxes create a "risk-sharing" effect through random payments to the
government. This lowers the entrepreneur’s risk-premium and encourages entry. While
through the two previous channels lower taxation encourages entry, here taxation discour-
ages entry.
Two implications of these countervailing incentives underpin our empirical analysis.
First, the sign (and size) of the outcome of a change in corporate taxation is not a priori
clear. Second, the effect is unlikely to be constant across different values of the effective
tax rate, and one could expect non-linear effects.
One reason why the net outcome of reduced taxation is unclear is that through the
"income shifting" and "risk subsidy" channels it leads to more entry, while through the
2We refer the reader to the article for the derivation of the model, in particular equation (1a) on page
1484.
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"risk-sharing" channels it leads to less entry. Since all these effects entail a discrete choice–
whether or not to incorporate a new business–, the distribution of expected profits, its
profile over time, and the exact shape of the effective corporate income tax, all contribute to
determining the net outcome in terms of entry. A priori, therefore, it is not possible to sign
the outcome of a change in the effective corporate tax rate. Indeed, Cullen and Gordon’s
estimates for the US suggest that the (negative) "risk-sharing" effect is potentially as large
as the other two (positive) effects. It is therefore important to bring the issue to the data.
Cullen and Gordon’s model also suggests that changing corporate income taxation may
affect entry rates in a non-linear fashion. All the three effects are likely to be non-linear,
due to the discrete choice of the decision to incorporate. For this reason, any reasonable
distribution of expected profits (i.e., any distribution that is not uniform) will result in a
non-linear effect of taxation on entry.
Since entrepreneurial risk-taking often results in short-term losses the presence of carry-
forward provisions will further enhance such non-linear effects for the "income shifting"
and "risk subsidy" channels: even a small tax saving may ensure the long-term viability
of businesses that expect low (or negative) profits. On the other hand the "risk-sharing"
effect is likely to be more pronounced at high tax rates, since it is at high(er) rates that
risk-sharing affects incorporation. These non-linear effects can potentially be very strong
due to the highly skewed distribution of potential entrants’ expected income.
Cullen and Gordon’s model clearly identifies the channels through which corporate
income taxation can affect the incorporation decision in a partial equilibrium setting with
uncertainty. The effects of taxation on entry, however, could also spring from the interac-
tion between entrants and incumbents that needs to be analyzed in a general equilibrium
setting. To take this into account we look at a strand of theoretical literature that ad-
dresses the role of taxation on entry in the context of imperfectly competitive markets.
A seminal paper in this area is Besley (1989), who looks at the effect of the introduction
of a per unit tax on the number of firms in equilibrium in a simple oligopoly model with
quantity competition. He shows that whereas taxation affects negatively total industry
output, both the output per firm (the ’intensive’ effect) and the number of firms (the
’extensive’ effect) may rise or fall when such a tax is imposed. The latter effect depends
on the functional form assumptions for the inverse demand and the cost functions, and
points to the need of empirical analysis.
Closer to the spirit of our paper, Romer (1994) and Appelbaum and Katz (1996)
directly address the impact of corporate taxation on entry. Both models predict a negative
effect. In the case of Romer’s paper the gist of the argument is that taxes on ex post
profits may severely restrict the provision of new goods in isolated monopolistic markets
due to the presence of a fixed cost of entry. Appelbaum and Katz develop a model
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that explicitly looks into the effects of corporate income taxation on incumbents’ and
entrants’ behavior in an oligopolistic setting. They show that corporate taxation may affect
industrial structure since it tends to favor incumbents over entrants through a "first-mover"
advantage associated with the accumulation of profits by incumbents. Since profits provide
incumbents with a "safety cushion," they may be willing to increase output strategically
in order to deter entry. Taxation of profits naturally increases this effect, making entry
less appealing.3
3 Data Sources and Definitions
3.1 Entry data
Our first data source is the Amadeus database published by Bureau van Dijk Electronic
Publishing. The database is updated monthly and our analysis is based on each year’s
December issue, from 2000 to 2007. Amadeus collects company accounts from 38 European
countries, covering financial information, industry activity codes, legal form, legal status,
ownership, and date of incorporation. In principle, all non-financial companies required
to file accounts should enter the database. The coverage has increased over time, and in
2007 it reached nearly 9 million companies. Data are collected from a variety of sources,
including chambers of commerce and company registries, and are checked by Bureau van
Dijk for consistency. A detailed description of the Amadeus database can be found in
Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006). Table 1 provides the definitions of all our variables.
We use information from Amadeus to construct our dependent variable: the entry
rate at country—industry level. Section 4 details the steps involved in constructing this
variable. While Bureau van Dijk made available an enlarged version of Amadeus since
1999, we cautiously build our dataset starting with the 2000 edition because only in that
year we observe the coverage of European companies to increase substantially.4
3.2 Taxation data
Our main independent variable is a set of effective average corporate tax rates for each
country, industry, and year. We build these variables from information we collect from the
Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide and The Global Executive publications by Ernst&Young,
a leading multinational tax consulting firm. These publications are compiled yearly by
3See also Pfann and Kranenburg (2003) for a structural model of entry and fiscal policy which looks at
the effect of an input tax on the availability of new products in small markets.
4Before 1999 Bureau van Dijk published what is now the “Top 250,000” version, which includes only
large companies.
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Ernst&Young’s local offices in over 140 countries following common criteria, ensuring high
professional standards and consistency both over time and across countries.
From the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, we gather information on statutory corpo-
rate tax rates and on statutory depreciation rates. These include tax rates at the local
level. From The Global Executive tax guide we collect data on personal taxation. TAX—
EATR is the resulting effective average tax rate.
In order to compute effective tax rates at the country-industry level we need informa-
tion about each industry’s profitability, that we gather from the OECD’s STAN database.
Section 5 details the steps involved in constructing effective average corporate tax rates.
3.3 Economic policy data
Our second main independent variable, PRO-BUSINESS—POLICY, is the Index of Eco-
nomic Freedom, published yearly by the Heritage Foundation (www.heritage.org) and the
Wall Street Journal. We use this measure to account for a country’s overall policy towards
business creation. For each country and year, the Index spans nine specific policy factors
(and the resulting economic ’freedom’): regulation of business activity (business freedom),
regulation of international trade flows (trade freedom), extent of tax burden (fiscal free-
dom), extent of public ownership (freedom from the government), price stability (monetary
freedom), regulation of banks and financial institutions (financial freedom), regulation of
foreign investments (investment freedom), quality of property rights (property rights), and
the enforcement of anti-corruption laws (freedom from corruption). Each factor is evalu-
ated using national and international sources (e.g. World Bank publications, World Trade
Organization data, OECD databases, national official publications, etc.) augmented with
other synthetic indicators (e.g. Transparency International’s corruption index, the Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit reports, etc.), and with qualitative opinions of an academic advisory
board (see Beach and Kane (2007)).
A second set of policy variables comes from the World Competitiveness Yearbook
(WCY), a yearly publication of the Institute of Management Development (IMD), a Swiss
business school. Data from the WCY have been used in previous studies to measure eco-
nomic policies and the quality of institutional infrastructure (e.g., Djankov et al. (2002)).
The WCY contains a set of indicators that are meant to capture the degree of business-
friendliness of specific dimensions of the regulatory framework and vary across countries
and time. A higher score denotes a more favorable policy from businesses’ point of
view. These measures cover the following areas: anti-trust regulations (ANTITRUST—
REGULATION), the quality of the country’s bureaucracy (BUREAUCRACY), the ex-
tent of corruption in the public administration (CORRUPTION), the strictness of hiring
and firing regulations (LABOR—REGULATION), and the ease of access to (domestic or
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foreign) capital by companies (ACCESS—CAPITAL). From the WCY we also employ an
alternative measure of fiscal burden (PERCEPTION—TAX), that measures the extent
to which corporate taxes are perceived by business leaders to discourage entrepreneurial
activity.
3.4 Instrumental variables
In our analysis we take into account the likely endogeneity of tax policy. For this, we use
five variables that come from three different sources. From the World Bank’s Database of
Political Institutions, which has been extensively used in the political economy literature,
we take the ideological orientation of the chief executive’s party (GOV—CENTER—LEFT),
the number of players with veto power in the political system (VETO—POWER), and the
degree of government fragmentation (GOV—FRAGMENTATION). From the International
Country Risk Guide published by the PRS Group Inc. (www.prs.com) we take a measure of
government stability (GOV—STABILITY), and from Wolfram Nordsieck’s online database
of parliamentary elections (www.parties-and-elections.de) we obtain the dates of legislative
election in each country (ELECTION—DATE).
4 Computing Entry Rates
We build our sample of companies with the goal of obtaining a homogeneous, comparable
set of firms across countries, across industries, and over time. Table A1 in the Appendix
describes the steps we follow in selecting the firms that we include in the dataset. Our
approach closely follows the strategy of Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006).
First, we include all the 15 Western European countries which are members of the
European Union: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. We
also include Norway and Switzerland, two European countries that are not members of
the EU.5
Second, we include all incorporated and limited liability companies, but exclude part-
nerships, sole proprietorships, cooperatives and other legal forms. One reason for this is
that we want to focus on the creation of successful companies, rather than on firm creation
per se. According to Eurostat, average employment in 2004 was 1.9 at un-incorporated
companies and 38.5 at incorporated companies.6 Incorporation provides entrepreneurs
5We do not consider Malta and Cyprus, which recently accessed the EU, because of their small size.
We do not include also Baltic and Central European accession countries because of the different coverage
in the years we consider.
6Several studies show that larger companies are more likely to incorporate See, for instance, Cullen and
Gordon (2007), Gentry and Hubbard (2004), Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997), and Georgellis and Wall
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with protection from creditors, allowing them to take riskier, but potentially more re-
warding, strategies. Incorporation also imposes on companies more transparency, which in
turn allows better access to external finance (see Egger, Keuschnigg, and Winner (2009)).
Both features should result in more growth. A second reason for excluding unincorporated
firms is coverage. Amadeus coverage of incorporated companies is substantial and regular,
largely because these companies typically have to file their accounts. Coverage is instead
sparse and erratic for the other legal forms.
Third, we include firms active in manufacturing and in business-related services, and
we exclude companies in the primary sector and in regulated services.7 This yields 39
industries, measured at 2-digit NACE Revision 1 classification code level, the standard
classification system used in Europe. There are 5,304 industry-country-year potential ob-
servations; from these we drop 421 observations for which we have less than five companies,
and 78 observations relative to UK and Irish industries in 1997, for which data are missing.
We obtain 4,805 usable observations.
Fourth, when a company reports both consolidated and unconsolidated statements, we
only include the unconsolidated statements in order to avoid double-counting firms with
subsidiaries (see Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006) for a discussion).
Finally, we need to make some assumptions on the timing of our data. Amadeus
includes all companies which are required to file their accounts; it keeps a company for
four years after its last filing, and deletes the company (with its historical data) from the
database afterwards. Amadeus also deletes companies which stop filing because they go
bankrupt or are acquired.8 We therefore expect that a company entering Amadeus in
2000 will remain in the database at least until 2004, and it will be deleted since 2005 if
it stops filing accounts after 2000. The fact that firms are continuously included into and
deleted from Amadeus justifies our choice of gathering data from consecutive Amadeus
issues. While it requires substantially more work than downloading the historical data
from one single issue, this strategy provides a more careful computation of entry rates.
We also need to choose how far back in time we gather information from. Because of
delays in filing of accounting reports, and because of the time it takes to enter them in
the database, we expect that a new company should appear in the database only two to
three years after its incorporation.9 Computing entry rates from ‘too recent’ Amadeus
(2006).
7We exclude these industries because their coverage is likely to be uneven across countries, as some
industries are highly country-specific (such as mining or fishing) or differently regulated (such as public
administration, health and social work).
8A company may stop filing for several reasons, including the fact that it does not meet any more the
filing requirements of its country.
9Countries differ in the period a company can take to file its accounts. There can also be delays
between the filing of the accounts and their recording in the database because BvD assembles data from
local information providers and checks their consistency. This data gathering process increases data quality
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issues brings the risk of over-estimating entry rates when many incumbents have been
dropped because they stopped filing. At the same time, computing entry rates from ‘too
old’ Amadeus issues brings the risk of under-estimating entry rates by losing entrants
whose records are entered with a delay. We strike a balance by choosing to compute entry
rates with respect to year − 3, where  is the issue year of the database for our base case
analysis. We then use the data from year  − 2 to check the robustness of our results to
this choice.
For each of the eight available Amadeus December issues (from 2000 to 2007), we
then compute two numbers. The first is the number of companies, in each country and
industry, whose date of incorporation is − 3 (the ’entrants’). The second is the number
of companies,whose date of incorporation precedes year − 3 that are still active in year
−3 (the ’incumbents’).10 The entry rate (ENTRY—COUNTRY—INDUSTRY) is given by
the ratio of these two numbers:
 −  −  = (Number of entrants)(Number of active incumbents)
where  indexes industries,  indexes countries and  indexes time. Entry rates for t=1997
are computed from the December 2000 Amadeus issue, entry rates for 1998 from the
December 2001 issue, and so on. Country-industry entry rates (ENTRY—COUNTRY—
INDUSTRY) constitute our dependent variable. For comparison with previous studies, we
also report descriptive statistics for entry rates at the country level (ENTRY—COUNTRY).
5 Computing Effective Marginal Tax Rates
Obtaining a meaningful measure of actual corporate income taxation is not a trivial task.
The statutory tax rate is not a satisfactory measure because taxation depends also on the
tax base, i.e. taxable corporate income. A high corporate income tax rate applied to a
thin tax base may in fact be more attractive than a lower tax rate applied to a larger tax
base.
An alternative measure is given by the average tax rate, computed as the ratio of tax
payments to taxable income. However, such ‘implicit’ tax rates are backward-looking as
they reflect the effect of taxation on the past corporate history of profits and investment
decisions.
A third approach is the so-called ‘tax analyzer model’ (see European Commission
(2001)), where the computation of the tax burden is based on a ‘standard’ firm character-
but may also cause delays in the appearance of information in the database.
10A company is considered to be active in a given year if it reports at least some key accounting data
for that year (total assets, sales, profits, number of employees).
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ized by a set of features with respect to its industry, its balance sheet structure and size, its
revenues, and its expected development over a given number of years. This methodology
has the advantage of making comparisons across countries easier, even if one includes a
large set of taxes and contributions, e.g. taxes on labor, property, energy, etc. The main
drawback is that these measures lack generality, because they heavily rely on the spe-
cific characteristics of the ‘standard’ firm–that may not be equally representative across
countries and across time. This is the approach used by Djankov et al. (2008).
A more satisfactory approach consists of using ‘effective’ tax measures. King and
Fullerton (1984) were the first to propose an effective marginal tax rate measure, and De-
vereux and Griffith (1998b) propose the effective average tax rate (EATR). These measures
have the advantage of being both theoretically grounded–they are based on a neoclassi-
cal theoretical model with forward-looking agents–and relevant for corporate decisions.
Moreover, the EATR has been developed to study discrete investment choices like the de-
cision to incorporate in a given country, which suits well our analysis. This is the approach
we follow.
The computation of the EATR is based on the definition of a hypothetical investment
project characterized by a set of assumptions about the type of assets purchased, the
way it is financed, and the type of their investors. Taxes affect the rate of return of the
investment, and the EATR is defined as the proportional reduction in the profitability
rate that follows the taxation of the income stream generated by the investment:
 − ≡ 
∗ −
∗
where ∗ is the pre-tax net present value of the project, and  is the corresponding after-
tax value. Like the ‘tax analyzer model,’ also the size and distribution of the EATR depend
on some assumptions, but with the advantage of capturing the main features of national
tax systems while allowing more generality in the evaluation of the corporate tax burden
and requiring less stringent assumptions.11 Notice, as we show in the Appendix, that the
effective average corporate income tax rate, which is relevant for the incorporation decision,
is not a linear function of the statutory tax rate, which is the concept one intuitively thinks
of as policy instrument.
Several authors have adopted the EATR as the relevant measure of corporate tax bur-
den for companies’ decision among mutually exclusive discrete investment projects. For
instance, Devereux and Griffith (1998a) study the effect of taxes on the location deci-
sions of US multinational companies, while Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné and Lahrèche-Révil
11 In principle, one should also account for the fact that some entrants are subsidiaries of multinational
companies, and include the effective tax rate relevant in their home country. However, it turns out that
foreign entrants are only a tiny fraction (about 2%) of the total, so that we do not analyze this inter-
dependency.
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(2005) and Buettner and Ruf (2007) analyze the link between corporate income tax rates
and foreign direct investments in European countries. We now describe the assumptions
underlying the computation of the EATR, following the methodology of Devereux and
Griffith (1998b).
5.1 Assumptions on the investment project
We consider a domestic investment in plant and machinery by a resident company. As
we discuss in Section 5.5, our empirical results are unchanged when the investment also
includes industrial buildings, office equipment or intangible assets. The project is char-
acterized by a rate of return and a cost of capital. The (forward-looking) rate of return
of the investment is industry-specific. Our baseline hypothesis is that the rate of return
associated with the project is equal to the rate of return in the corresponding US industry,
irrespective of the particular European country where it is undertaken. In other words,
we conjecture that an industry’s profitability is closer to its ’natural’ rate in the US, be-
cause of fewer regulations and restrictions to competition and entry, and therefore a more
competitive environment. Moreover, the period under study has seen profound structural
changes in European economies, so that past EU profitability may have been a poor gauge
of future profitability.
We approximate the profitability rate by the difference between an industry’s total
value added and total cost of labour as a percentage of total value added: (Total Value
Added — Total Labor Cost)/Total Value Added. We obtain data to compute yearly profit
rates for US industries from the OECD STAN database.12
Modelling the project’s cost of capital requires some assumptions on the sources of
finance. In our base case we assume that the investment is fully financed by new share
issues. Notice that in the absence of personal taxation, there is no difference for the
effective marginal tax rate whether the project is financed by retained earnings or the
issue of new shares. We also consider debt financing. The main effect of allowing debt is
the possibility to deduct interest payments, creating a ’debt tax shield’ that reduces the
amount of taxable income. Therefore, the inclusion of debt leads to lower effective average
tax rates, all else equal. To account for this effect we introduce an effective average tax
rate that incorporate the effect of the tax shield (TAX—EATR—DEBT).
12Devereux and Griffith (2003) show that the EATR approaches the statutory tax rate as profitability
increases, and the two coincide for profitability rates close to 100%. When the investment is very profitable,
the stream of income of the project largely exceeds its costs, and tax allowances become less important.
In our data, in the absence of personal taxes, industries with very high profitability rates in the US
experience an EATR that is larger than in industries with low profitability. Examples of industries with
high profitability rates are public utilities (76% on average), real estate (90%) and renting of machinery
and equipment (77%). Industries with low profitability include textiles (26%), and medical, precision and
optical instruments (13%).
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Inflation rates and interest rates also affect the cost of the investment through their
effect on the discount rate and on tax allowances on assets. Tax allowances depend on
the fiscal depreciation rates that are applied to the historical cost of the asset, without
adjusting for inflation. As inflation increases, nominal interest rates increase and the net
present value of tax allowances decreases, all else equal. Lower tax allowances, in turn,
mean higher after-tax investment cost and a higher effective average tax rate, all else
equal.
We obtain inflation rates from Eurostat. Inflation rates vary over time and across
countries, but not across industries. Following the literature, we assume a common in-
flation rate for output and capital. The real interest rate is then obtained as (1 + ) =
(1 + )(1 + ), where  is the real interest rate,  is the inflation rate and  the nominal
interest rate. Nominal interest rates also vary over time and across countries; they are
given by interest rates on one-year public bonds, and are obtained from the Bulletin of
the European Central Bank.
5.2 Assumptions on the tax system
The assumptions about the investment project allows us to obtain an estimate for the
pre-tax value of the project (R*). To compute the after-tax value of the investment (R)
we need to introduce a set of assumptions on corporate and personal tax rates. In Tables
2 and 3 of the Appendix we provide formal definitions and further details, which largely
follow Devereux and Griffith (1998a).
TAX—EATR depends on statutory tax rates, depreciation rates, and tax allowances
on assets. An increase in the corporate tax rate, lowering the after tax rate of return
to the investment, raises TAX—EATR (all else equal). However the change in TAX—
EATR is less than proportional, because of the presence of tax allowances on capital
assets. Higher capital allowances lower TAX—EATR. In our baseline specification we
present results based on the maximum fiscal depreciation rate for plant and machinery,
and on current capital allowances for each country. These results are robust to using a
large variety of weighted averages of depreciation rates for plant and machinery, industrial
buildings, office equipment and intangible assets.
As a robustness check, we also consider a specification that includes local taxes (TAX—
EATR—LOCAL), and a specification that includes personal taxation (TAX—EATR—PERSONAL).13
13The exclusion of personal taxation can be justified on a number of grounds. First, in the absence of
personal taxation, we are able to concentrate on the effect of the corporate tax rate, through the effective
tax rate, on our measure of entry. Second, introducing personal taxation requires making assumptions
about shareholders’ attributes like nationality or income, so that the choice of the ’correct’ shareholder is
to some extent arbitrary. Finally, from a theoretical point of view, the assumption of international perfect
capital mobility should make the investment behaviour of firms independent of personal taxes.
13
The relevant personal income includes interest income, dividend income, and capital
gains.14 We collect data on the three corresponding final (i.e., after witholdings) tax
rates for a resident taxpayer. The personal tax rate on interest income is the tax rate
on income from interest-bearing investments (e.g., deposit accounts, bonds, and other se-
curities). The personal tax rate on dividends (and the corresponding tax credit) is the
maximum tax rate on dividend distributions, and the personal capital gains tax rate is
the tax rate on capital gains from the disposal of shares. The personal tax rate on in-
terest income negatively affects shareholders’ discount rate. Higher taxation of dividends
increases the effective average tax rate associated to the investment. Finally, the taxation
of capital gains has an ambiguous effect since it influences both the shareholders’ discount
rate and the return on the investment.
6 Empirical Analysis
6.1 Descriptive evidence
We start our analysis by describing our data. Table 1 provides the definitions and sources
of all variables. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the whole sample. Table 3 reports
descriptive statistics by country for entry rates and for our two main independent variables.
In addition, Figures 1, 2, and 3 describe the evolution over time of the main variables of
interest.15 Four characteristics of the data are worth mentioning at this stage.
First, the mean yearly entry rates at the aggregate level (8.27% for the ENTRY—
COUNTRY variable, and 7.02% for the ENTRY—COUNTRY—INDUSTRY variable, see
Table 2) hide a significant between-country variation (see Table 3). The UK, Denmark
and Austria show consistently high entry rates, while Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and Portugal show consistently low entry rates. Comfortingly, our ranking of countries is
very similar to the one reported in Djankov et al. (2008) and in Klapper, Laeven, and
Rajan (2006). It is important to acknowledge the possibility that these differences do
not reflect underlying differences in industry dynamics but differences in data collection
practices across countries.16 For this reason it is crucial to be able to rely on panel data,
which allow us to exploit the longitudinal dimension to control for any possible industry—
14From the point of view of a shareholder, the stream of taxable income that the investment generates
is given by dividends and capital gains. The tax rate on interest income instead affects the shareholder’s
nominal discount rate.
15Our data constitute an unbalanced panel because of missing observations for some country-industry
pairs and/or years, as we explain in Section 4. Notice that in Table 2 and Figure 1 Switzerland has a very
high country-level entry; this is due to the high entry rate for 1997, probably because of a change in filing
requirements in that year.
16For instance, the observed low entry rates for Italy and Ireland might, at least partly, depend on an
incomplete coverage for the ‘date of incorporation’ or for the ‘industry’ variable, respectively.
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country systematic differences in the data collection. This is an important improvement
on the previous literature.
Second, as it is apparent from Table 3, there is a negative correlation at the country
level between corporate taxation (TAX—EATR) and a country’s policy attitude towards
entrepreneurship as proxied by the PRO—BUSINESS—POLICY variable. For instance,
Ireland has the lowest corporate tax rate and the highest score for the PRO—BUSINESS—
POLICY index. At the opposite, most Southern European countries (France, Greece, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain) have high corporate tax rates and at the same time denote a rela-
tively unfriendly attitude towards entrepreneurship. This implies that the identification
of the direct effect of corporate taxation on entry requires to control for other economic
relevant factors which are likely to move together with taxation both cross-sectionally and
longitudinally.
Third, since our identification strategy exploits only within-country variation, we pro-
vide some prima facie evidence on the evolution of the empirical distributions of our main
variables of interest over time (see Figure 1). Overall, entry rates show a moderately
pro-cyclical pattern not only at the mean but also at most quartiles. Effective average
tax rates are characterized instead by a pronounced downward trend at the mean, which
is only partially reproduced at the quartiles (see Figure 2), consistent with the results
of Slemrod (2004). On the contrary, PRO—BUSINESS—POLICY shows a clear upward
trend both at the mean and at the quartiles (see Figure 3). This points again to the po-
tential identification problems associated to the omission of country-specific time-varying
controls, and provides an additional motivation for the use of panel data.
Fourth, a simple comparison between the distribution of our main measures of effective
marginal tax rates (TAX—EATR, TAX—EATR—LOCAL and TAX—EATR—DEBT) and the
distribution of the effective marginal rates that includes personal taxation (TAX—EATR—
PERSONAL) shows that the inclusion of personal taxation increases not only the mean–
as obviously expected–but also the variance (Table 2). To what extent this is a genuine
feature of taxation in European countries or instead an undesired effect of the difficulties
in obtaining country-year consistent series on personal taxation is difficult to say. For this
reason we cautiously avoid including personal taxation in our main analysis, and check
the robustness of our findings to its inclusion in our robustness checks.
Finally, we notice that it is important for the interpretation of our results that changes
in TAX—EATR come from genuine variation in statutory tax rates at the country-industry
level, and not from variation in different components of the effective average tax rate. We
verify that this is indeed the case. An increase in the statutory tax rate from 25th to
the 75th percentile (i.e., from 28% to 35%) results in TAX—EATR rising from 25.1% to
31.4%; this corresponds to a shift from the 10th to the 55th percentile in the distribution
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of TAX—EATR. By contrast, an increase of the profitability rate from the 25th to the
75th percentile brings an increase of EATR of only 1.7 percentage points (from 27.4% to
29.1%).
6.2 Estimation Strategy
We now discuss the empirical strategy that we follow to estimate the relationship between
entry rates, on the one hand, and corporate taxation and other potentially relevant country
characteristics, on the other hand. Let  be the entry rate at time  referred to industry
 located in country . We estimate the following equation:
 =  + g(−1)0γ + x0−1β +  +  (1)
The main variable of interest is −1, which represents the (lagged) effective tax
rate (TAX—EATR) and varies across time, industries, and countries. TAX—EATR is the
relevant tax rate to be applied to discrete investment projects. In equation (1) we allow
the effective tax measure to enter non-linearly with alternative polynomial specifications,
which we discuss in the next Section. The variable  is a time effect that we model
by introducing year dummies. The vector x−1 includes a set of (lagged) observable
regressors which vary across countries and over time, but not across industries. These
variables represent additional country-specific time-varying factors potentially affecting
entry rates.
The two remaining variables in equation (1) are unobservable error components. In
particular, the term  represents a country-industry specific effect capturing the set of
characteristics which are relevant to the entry decision but cannot be included among the
regressors because they are not observed. These include country-specific characteristics
(e.g. cultural attitudes towards entrepreneurship) and industry-specific characteristics
(e.g. structural entry barriers), as well as unobservable factors which vary across both
industries and countries but that can be reasonably thought to be constant over time, at
least during our sample period (e.g. industry specialization).
The main econometric challenge is to consistently estimate γ and β under reasonable
identification assumptions. Problems here can arise for two different reasons. First, some
of our explanatory variables are potentially correlated with unobservable (or unobserved)
time-invariant, country-industry level omitted variables. To overcome this first source of
endogeneity it is standard practice to use appropriate transformations (e.g. ‘within group’
or ‘first differences’) which remove unobserved heterogeneity, , from the original model.
Notice that in our set-up standard errors are robust to within-unit () heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation of unknown forms. Given our within-group transformation we also
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allow for any arbitrary form of spatial correlation in both dimensions (industry and coun-
try) to the extent that spatial clustering is captured through the unobserved effect, 
(see Wooldridge (2006), p.12).
The second problem is that the identification of structural effects through regression
coefficients in deviations from country-industry specific means (i.e. the within-group trans-
formation) requires lack of correlation between the regressors and the idiosyncratic error
term at all leads and lags. This strict exogeneity assumption rules out the possibility that
current values of some of the explanatory variables are correlated with present and past
idiosyncratic errors. This is unlikely to be the case here since policy-makers might well
respond to shocks which are negatively correlated to entry rates by lowering corporate
taxation.
The standard solution to this second source of endogeneity is to find convincing external
instruments. In this paper, we borrow from the recent political economy literature and
explore the possibility of using several complementary measures of the political process
(see, e.g., Pagano and Volpin (2005)). These include the date of election (ELECTION—
DATE), the ideological orientation of the elected government (GOV—CENTER—LEFT)
as well as its perceived stability (GOV—STABILITY). Furthermore, we also take into
account two proxies for the fragmentation of the political system: VETO—POWER, a
measure of ideological heterogeneity in the cabinet, and GOV—FRAGMENTATION, a
measure of fragmentation of the opposition. As it is well known, good instruments have
to be both valid–that is orthogonal to the transformed error term –and relevant (or
non—weak)–that is ‘significantly’ correlated with the endogenous variables. Accordingly,
the set of instruments to be included in the relevant first stages has been selected from the
available list on the basis of appropriate specification tests for instrument validity (Hansen
J and C tests)17 and relevancy (Cragg-Donald and Kleibergen-Paap tests).18
Notice that the nature of our analysis prevents us from using several (largely) time-
invariant instruments that are widely employed in cross-country studies, and which relate
to the nature of the electoral system, such as the use of majoritarian or proportional
electoral rules, the tenure of democracy, or the minimum share of votes necessary to
17Hansen’s J Statistics is the well-known Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, and it is
distributed as chi-squared under the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid.
18Note that weak-identification tests are not fully developed for the case of non-i.i.d. errors. In particular
the weak identification test that uses the Cragg-Donald statistic (Cragg and Donald (1993)) requires an
assumption of i.i.d errors (Stock and Yogo (2005)). This is potentially a serious problem in our context
(and indeed in most applications), where heteroskedastcity, autocorrelation, and possibly also clustering
are likely to be present. Under these circumstances a large test statistic might not be a signal of model
adequacy but simply reflects the fact that the disturbances are not i.i.d.. Baum et al. (2007) suggest
reporting the Kleibergen-Paap statistic (Kleibergen and Paap (2006)) as the robust analog of the Cragg-
Donald statistic, and to use with caution the critical values computed by Stock and Yogo, since critical
values for this statistic are not available.
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obtain parliamentary representation etc. (see, e.g., Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno
(2002) and Persson and Tabellini (2004)).
6.3 Econometric results
We address the effect of corporate income taxation on entry rates by estimating several
versions of equation (1). Our baseline specification includes as explanatory variables (a
quadratic expression in) TAX—EATR and PRO-BUSINESS—POLICY. The quadratic term
in TAX—EATR allows us to test the existence of non-linearities of the form described in
Section 2. We also experimented with higher order terms in TAX—EATR, but these are
not significant at conventional statistical levels in all reported equations. Also, the null
hypothesis that the parameter on the second order term is equal to zero is strongly rejected.
PRO-BUSINESS—POLICY, the economic freedom score, proxies for time-varying country-
specific policies towards firm creation. This variable is expected to enter our equations
with a positive sign. Within-group estimation results are reported in column 1 of Table 4.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the coefficients on corporate taxa-
tion (TAX—EATR and TAX—EATR—SQ) are found to be respectively negatively and pos-
itively signed. They are also both significant at conventional statistical levels. Secondly,
as expected, PRO-BUSINESS—POLICY is found to be positive and significant.
We find that a reduction of the tax rate from the median (30.04%) to the first quartile
(27.57%) implies a 0.107 percentage point increase in the entry rate. On the other hand,
a reduction from the third quartile (33.44%) to the median is found to have the opposite
sign (—0.145). Furthermore, both effects are significant at conventional statistical levels.
Taken at its face value, this implies that the marginal effect on entry rates is a negative
function of the initial tax rate.19
Before drawing strong conclusions, however, we need to address the main limitation of
our estimation approach, namely the strong exogeneity assumption for TAX—EATR, and
TAX—EATR—SQ. For this reason we report in column 2 of Table 4 additional estimates
based on alternative–and more plausible–orthogonality assumptions. Building on the
recent political economy literature, we use as instruments four variables: GOV—CENTER—
LEFT, VETO—POWER, GOV—STABILITY, and ELECTION—DATE. These variables are
defined in Table 1. The crucial identification assumption is that these variables do not
affect entry rates directly, but only indirectly, that is through their effect on corporate tax
decisions at the political level. In the first stage regressions (reported in column 3) more
stable governments (GOV—STABILITY) at the beginning of their term (ELECTION—
19 Imposing linearity would be incorrect, since this is rejected by the data. Still, if we did this, we would
find a negative and significant coefficient equal to —0.028. This effect is smaller than that found by Djankov
et al. (2008), who find that a decrease of ten percentage points in taxation brings to a 1.4 percentage point
increase in the entry rate.
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DATE) and operating in less fragmented political systems (VETO—POWER) turn out to
be associated with lower levels of corporate taxation.20 Comfortingly, both the validity of
this set of instruments and the exogeneity assumption for the PRO-BUSINESS—POLICY
variable are not rejected by the data according to Hansen’s J and C statistics. This
suggests that the data, in our context, support our choice to treat policy towards firm
creation as exogenous. As we show in Section 6.5.3, our results however hold also in the
case where we treat PRO-BUSINESS—POLICY as endogenous and instrument it along
with taxation. Analogously, the null of weak identification is rejected at conventional
statistical levels according to both the Cragg-Donald and the Kleibergen-Paap statistics.
Once we instrument TAX—EATR, the effect we detect (see column 2 of Table 4) is
statistically significant and economically non-negligible. A reduction of the corporate tax
rate from the median (30.04%) to the first quartile (27.57%) implies a 0.880 percentage
point increase in the entry rate. A reduction from the third quartile (33.44) to the me-
dian implies a 0.270 percentage point increase in the entry rate. This result is consistent
with the "income shifting" and "risk subsidy" effects of a reduction of effective corporate
taxation being stronger at lower levels of taxation, and the "risk-sharing" effect being
stronger at higher levels. This is not surprising, given the well known-fact that the dis-
tribution of many firm level variables, including the size and the profitability of entrants,
is highly skewed (Cabral and Mata (2003)). Notice also that the instrumented estimates
are larger than those of the within-group regressions. Comfortingly, the Cragg-Donald
and Kleinbergen-Paap statistics support the relevance of our instruments. Possible expla-
nation for this difference in estimates are therefore the violation of the strict exogeneity
assumption or a possible attenuation bias associated with error in the measurement of the
tax variables.
6.4 Extensions
In this section we extend our results in three directions. First, we include into the analysis
tax provisions for new businesses, in particular the possibility to carry forward losses.
Second, we consider including alternative time-varying potential policy determinants of
entry. Third, we put our results in context, and make a first step in asking when taxation
policy is more effective.
20At first sight, the sign of the GOV—CENTER—LEFT might seem counterintuitive. Note, however, that
identification here is achieved only through within-country variation, and therefore this result is likely to
be sensitive to single specific episodes. Indeed, a closer inspection into the data reveals that the negative
sign on GOV—CENTER—LEFT reflects almost exclusively the reduction in corporate taxation introduced
by the left-wing German government of chancellor Schroeder after 1998.
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6.4.1 Accounting for loss carry-forward provisions
New businesses often receive a more favorable tax treatment. A major advantage they
enjoy is the possibility to carry losses forward to future fiscal years (see Da Rin, Nicodano,
and Sembenelli (2006) for a discussion).21 Table 5 reports results where we include loss
carry-forward (CARRY—FWD) and loss carry-back (CARRY—BACK) provisions. Column
2, that reports the instrumented estimates, shows a positive effect of carry-forward provi-
sions, that is statistically highly significant. As expected, CARRY—BACK turns out to be
less important for newly incoporated companies, that are unlikely to have paid taxes in
the past. We also notice that our estimates for TAX—EATR and TAX—EATR—SQ retain
the sign, size, and statistical significance they had in Table 4, confirming that including
or not tax provisions for new businesses does not materially affect our analysis.
6.4.2 Alternative economic policy measures
In Table 6 we replace the PRO-BUSINESS—POLICY variable with a set of alternative
variables which are meant to capture separately specific country characteristics which
reflect non-tax economic policies with a potential effect on entry rates. For example,
Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006) show that regulation costs reduce entry rates. Cic-
cone and Papaioannou (2007) find evidence of a negative relationship between bureau-
cracy (measured by the number of procedures a start-up has to comply with) and entry,
while Perotti and Volpin (2007) highlight the role of financial development and investor
protection in incorporation decisions. We therefore consider policies aimed at increas-
ing market competition (ANTITRUST—REGULATION), reducing bureaucratic red tape
(BUREAUCRACY), avoiding corruption in the public sector (CORRUPTION), lifting hir-
ing and firing constraints (LABOR—REGULATION), and fostering financial development
(ACCESS—CAPITAL). Since these variables capture different aspects of a government’s
overall attitude towards the economy, it is not surprising that they are highly collinear.
For this reason we introduce them one at a time.22
All of these variables have the expected sign, and three out of five are significant. The
precision of the point estimates is indeed almost surprising since we already control for
time-invariant country-industry components and therefore for these variables we exploit
in estimation only the small, and often correlated, within-country variability component.
More importantly from our perspective, the coefficients on TAX—EATR and TAX—EATR—
21 In principle, one would like to include not only loss-carry forward provisions, but also all possible tax
advantages bestowed on small businesses. We have tried hard to collect systematic longitudinal data of
this kind. However, it turned out to be an impossible task due to the sheer number of national and local
programmes, their complexity, and the difficulty of identifying them in a systematic way.
22We only report the GMM-IV regressions to fit the results in a single table; within-group and first stage
regressions are similar to the results of Table 4 and are available upon request.
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SQ, always statistically significant, are very close to our baseline estimates. This result is
also interesting in its own right since it points to the importance of several different policy
dimensions for the entry decision.
6.4.3 When is corporate tax policy most effective?
Now that we have established the importance of tax policy for entry rates, one interesting
question is to further ask whether the relationship between corporate taxation and entry
rates is constant, or whether it is a function of country-specific characteristics. To explore
this issue we look at accounting standards. These are a relevant element of a country’s
institutional infrastructure in our context because the benefits of a corporate tax reduction
are likely to be smaller in countries where it is easier to avoid the tax burden through the
manipulation of accounting books. In such countries, it may be easier to hide profits from
taxation, so that a lower corporate tax rate has less influence on the incentives to create (or
incorporate) a new company. For this reason, we partition our set of countries according
to whether their accounting standards are relatively ‘bad’ (Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal) or ‘good’ (Finland, France, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK). We take this partition
from LaPorta et al. (1998), by dividing countries on the basis of the reported ranking and
using the median as cutoff point.
Results are reported in Table 7. A quadratic specification is found to hold for both
subsets of countries, especially for the GMM-IV estimates reported in column 2. Moreover,
given the different shape of the two quadratic functions, the effect of a reduction in TAX—
EATR has a larger effect in countries with ‘good’ accounting standards at the lower tail of
the distribution of corporate taxation, that is when corporate taxation is found to have a
larger and more significant effect. This result supports our conjecture that lax accounting
standards allow more tax elusion (or evasion), and corporate taxation matters less for
entry since firms can already shield from taxation part of their income. The normative
implication of this finding is that policy-makers may increase the efficacy of a reduction
of corporate taxation by first making accounting standards more rigorous.
6.5 Robustness checks
In this section we assess the robustness of our baseline results with respect to four issues:
(i) alternative assumptions in the computation of the effective average tax rates (Table
8); (ii) alternative taxation measures (Table 9); (iii) the endogeity of PRO—BUSINESS—
POLICY (Table 10); and (iv) robustness to several of the assumptions we make in our
baseline model.
21
6.5.1 Alternative assumptions in the computation of TAX—EATR
As discussed in Section 5 (and in the Appendix), several assumptions have to be made
in order to derive an appropriate measure of the effective average corporate income tax
rate. A first issue is that our original measure TAX—EATR does not include local or
municipal taxes, surtaxes and supplementary charges. From a theoretical perspective,
there is no reason why these tax components should not be included. Still, there is a
legitimate concern that their inclusion might create measurement error problems since
building appropriate time-consistent series for these components of corporate taxation is
a very difficult task. This derives from the need to compute the appropriate tax base
for local taxes, which often differs for the tax base applicable to the national corporate
income tax. Furthermore, the fact that firms are observed at the national level makes
the choice of the ‘appropriate’ local taxation level rather arbitrary. Estimates presented
in the first three columns of Table 8 address this issue by replacing TAX—EATR with
an alternative tax measure (TAX—EATR—LOCAL) which includes these additional tax
components. In spite of our concerns, reported results turn out to be very similar to
those already discussed in the previous section.
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 8 address our assumptions on how the project is financed.
Since TAX—EATR is computed under the assumption that the project if fully financed
by issuing new shares, we have computed an additional measure (TAX—EATR—DEBT)
where it is assumed that the project if fully financed by new debt.23 The results show
that punctual estimates tend to be lower than the baseline case when WG estimation is
used. However, the GMM-IV coefficients reported in column 5 are very similar to the
GMM-IV estimates reported in Table 4, although our diagnostics signal potential weak
identification problems.
A third potential drawback of our original specification is that we overlook personal
taxation in the computation of the effective tax rate. This is not uncommon in this lit-
erature, and can be justified by noticing that in many countries the system of personal
taxation is so complex that one can well imagine a large variety of personal tax positions.
This, in turn, makes the identification of the ‘representative’ investor quite arbitrary. With
this caveat in mind, and following Devereux and Griffith (1998b), we have computed an
additional tax measure, TAX—EATR—PERSONAL, which incorporates personal taxation
in our benchmark case where the firm is fully financed by new share issues.24 As it can
be seen from column 7 of Table 8, within-group estimates of the coefficients on the tax
23Note that in the absence of personal taxes financing through retained earnings or through the issue
of new share yields the same expression for the effective tax rate. Our results are robust to using any
combination of financing sources.
24Similar results are found also with different combinations of financing sources, including the polar case
of full reliance on debt.
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variable turn out to be insignificant, both statistically and economically. The fact the
within-group estimator provides an imprecise point estimate is not surprising, as it prob-
ably reflects measurement error problems associated to the introduction of the personal
taxation elements in the formulas for corporate taxation. Finding an appropriate set of
instruments for TAX—EATR—PERSONAL has also proved to be a very difficult task.25 As
an illustrative example, in columns 8 and 9 we present the results obtained when using as
instruments GOV—CENTER—LEFT, GOV—STABILITY, and GOV—FRAGMENTATION.
Comfortingly, estimated coefficients come closer to those reported in Table 4 even if they
are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Note also that our specification tests
signal some unsolved mis-specification issues.
6.5.2 An alternative corporate tax measure
It might also be argued that potential entrants do not take their entry decision on the
basis of the effective tax rate but are driven by more qualitative factors which reflect
entrepreneurs’ perception of government behavior towards corporate income taxation. To
address this issue we replace TAX—EATR with an alternative– more qualitative–survey-
based variable obtained from the World Competitiveness Yearbook. PERCEPTION—TAX
is an ordinal variable that tries to measure the perceived attitude of national fiscal policies
toward entrepreneurship. Results are reported in Table 9 and conform to expectations.
In fact, both in column 1 (within-group) and in column 2 (GMM—IV) the coefficient
of PERCEPTION—TAX is negative and significant. Note, however, that the Hansen’s
J statistic is very high, casting some doubts on the validity of our instruments in this
particular equation.
6.5.3 The endogeneity of economic policy
Even if our endogeneity tests do not reject the null of exogeneity for PRO—BUSINESS—
POLICY, some legitimate concerns could still be raised on the basis of speculative eco-
nomic reasoning.26 In principle, entry rates and some of the variables which are part
of PRO—BUSINESS—POLICY (e.g., regulation of foreign investment) could be simultane-
ously affected by transitory unobserved shocks. To address this potential criticism, Table
10 reports the results of additional GMM-IV estimates, where PRO—BUSINESS—POLICY
is treated as endogenous and instrumented with the same set used for TAX—EATR and
TAX—EATR—SQ. Two interesting findings are worth highlighting. First, not only our weak
25Note that TAX—EATR—PERSONAL is only weakly correlated with the other tax measures: TAX—
EATR, TAX—EATR—LOCAL, and TAX—EATR—DEBT.
26The endogeneity test (Hansen’s C statistic) is performed to verify the exogeneity of PRO-BUSINESS—
POLICY. The statistics is distributed as chi-squared under the null hypothesis that the specified endoge-
nous regressors are exogenous.
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identification tests allow us to reject the null, but also our first stage results are consistent
with reasonable priors about the effect of the political environment on business policy.
Second, and more important for the purpose of the paper, all our previous results are
confirmed. In fact, the coefficients on TAX—EATR and TAX—EATR—SQ retain their sign,
magnitude, and statistical significance. Furthermore, PRO—BUSINESS—POLICY is found
to have a positive coefficient, although this is not significant at conventional statistical
levels.
We follow the same procedure also for the five individual policy measures obtained
from the World Competitiveness Report. The results, which are available upon request,
confirm those of Table 6, in that the effect of corporate taxation retains the same levels
of statistical and economic significance. In this case we also find that all policy measures
retain their statistical and economic significance. The only exception is in the case of labor
regulations, where the effect of corporate taxation becomes insignificant at conventional
levels.
6.5.4 Additional robustness checks
We have already reported our checks on the robustness of our results against the main
assumptions underlying our analysis. We also want to mention, without reporting for
space reasons, several additional checks, that are available upon request.
First, all our results are obtained with entry rates computed at −3. We also compute
entry rates with information at  − 2. We find that our results do not depend on this
choice, neither in terms of statistical significance, nor in terms of economic magnitude.
Second, we ran several additional robustness checks on the other assumptions underly-
ing the computation of TAX—EATR. This include alternative composition of the asset base
(i.e., a different mix of machinery and buildings, office equipment, and motor vehicles),
and a wide range of alternative economic depreciation rates, from 5% to 20%. We also
include intangible assets in the composition of the asset base. We find that these different
assumptions do not affect any of our results.
Third, we introduce additional time-varying covariates which have been found in the
literature to affect entry rates. Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006) include the ratio of
industry sales to total sales in order to capture a potential ’convergence effect’ that might
operate at the industry level, whereby larger industries are expected to display lower
entry rates. For this, we compute the INDUSTRY—SHARE variable and we include it in
an augmented version of our baseline specification. We find that the coefficient for the
industry share is negative, as expected, but not statistically significant. More importantly,
the effect of taxation on entry rates retains its magnitude and remains significant.
Fourth, we consider the possibility that business cycles unfold differently across coun-
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tries. For this, we obtain from Eurostat two measures of the economic cycle for each
country and year: the level of GDP, and its percentage variation. We obtain results which
are very similar, in both economic and statistical significance, to those of our baseline
specification.27
Fifth, we consider that our choice of US profitability as the natural benchmark may
be questionable, on the ground that European firms would base their choice on expected
profitability in Europe, or even just in their own country. We therefore substitute US
profitability at the industry level with either (i) a measure of Europe-wide average prof-
itability, or (ii) a measure of country-industry profitability. In either case, none of our
results is materially affected.
Finally, we consider that our main dependent measure is an entry ratio. The reason we
look at a ratio is that we want to capture the importance of entry relative to the current
size of an industry. However, we want to make sure that the effect we are capturing does
not depend on the distribution of incumbents across industries. For this, we also estimate
our equations by considering an absolute measure of the number of entrants. Since there
is high variability in this measure we adopt two alternative approaches. First, we use
the logarithm of the number of entrants. Second, we normalize the number of entrants by
the country’s population, which is arguably independent of the distribution of incumbents
across industries. The results we obtain for these specifications are very close to those of
our main specification of Table 4, confirming a concave effect of corporate income taxation.
Overall, therefore, our results appear to be consistently robust to a wide variety of
modifications of our baseline specification.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we pose ourselves a research question which is also relevant from a policy
perspective, that is whether, and to what extent, lowering corporate income taxation can
foster entrepreurship by inducing the entry (by incorporation) of new companies. To an-
swer this question, based on recent theoretical models of how taxation may affect entry, we
have exploited a newly constructed dataset which allows us to improve significantly on the
existing literature. In particular, the availability of disaggregate data with a longitudinal
dimension allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the country-industry level,
therefore avoiding the endemic omitted variable problem which affects previous purely
27As a further check we also employ a set of country-year dummies. Naturally, these absorb most of the
variation we are using to identify econometrically the parameters of interest. Therefore, it is not surprising
that the significance of the taxation measures falls below conventional levels. However, the size of the
estimated coefficients for TAX—EATR and TAX—EATR—SQ remain very close to those in the baseline
specification.
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cross-sectional studies. In addition, and equally important, we recognize in the paper that
additional endogeneity problems are likely to arise in this context because of feedback
effects. These might occur to the extent that policy-makers adjust corporate tax rates to
industry-wide idiosyncratic negative entry shocks. To address this problem, we borrow
from the recent political economy literature and introduce an innovative–and hopefully
convincing–instrumenting strategy.
What is the final verdict on the effect of corporate taxation on entry? On the whole,
there is strong evidence, which is robust across a variety of specifications, that corporate
taxation has indeed a statistically significant effect. This effect is robust to alternative
definitions of taxation and to the inclusion of a wide set of explanatory variables. Im-
portantly, we also find evidence supporting a non-linear relation which suggests that the
effect is at work only below a given initial threshold tax level. We also find that the effect
is economically non-negligible. In our preferred specification, a reduction of the corporate
tax rate from the median (30.04%) to the first quartile (27.57%) implies a 0.880 percent-
age point increase in the (country-industry) entry rate, or 12.5% of the 7.02% mean entry
rate. Interestingly, we also find that a reduction in corporate tax rates is more effective in
countries with better institutional infrastructure, as measured by the quality of accounting
standards, suggesting that a reduction in corporate tax rate would generate the creation of
more companies in countries where it is more difficult to hide income by manipulation of
the profit and loss accounts. This suggests a policy trade-off: while lowering taxes may be
easier to implement, countries with lower accounting standards may find that such policy
is indeed ineffective. Therefore, our analysis points to the complementarity of taxation
with more ’structural’ policies that may improve a country’s institutional standards.
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Table 1. Variable definitions
This Table describes all the variables used in the analysis.
VARIABLE DEFINITION AND SOURCES
ENTRY–COUNTRY Definition: For each year t and country c, we identify: (a) all companies
whose date of incorporation is t − 3, and (b) all companies whose date
of incorporation precedes year t− 3 that are still active in year t− 3. A
company is considered to be active in year t− 3 if it reports accounting
data for at least one of the following: total assets, total sales, operating
profits, number or cost of employees. The entry rate is computed as the
ratio of (a) over (b).
Source: Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database, 2000–2007 December is-
sues.
ENTRY–COUNTRY–
INDUSTRY
Definition: For each year t, country c, and industry i, we identify: (a)
all companies whose date of incorporation is t−3, and (b) all companies
in country c and industry i whose date of incorporation precedes year
t − 3 that are still active in year t − 3. A company is considered to be
active in year t − 3 if it reports accounting data for at least one of the
following: total assets, total sales, operating profits, number or cost of
employees. We drop industries with less than 5 companies.
Source: Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database, 2000–2007 December is-
sues.
TAX–EATR;
TAX–EATR–SQ
Definition: The Effective Average Tax Rate is defined by Devereux and
Griffith (1998b) as the proportional reduction in a project’s profitabil-
ity rate that follows the taxation of the income stream generated by
the project. If R∗ denotes the project’s pre-tax net present value, and
R its after-tax net present value, TAX–EATR ≡ (R∗ − R)/R∗. We
compute TAX–EATR under the following assumptions: (a) the statu-
tory corporate tax rates do not include local or municipal taxes, and
other supplementary charges; (b) the industry-specific profitability rate
equals that industry’s profitability rate in the US, computed for each
industry-year as: (Total Value Added – Total Labor Cost)/Total Value
Added, using data from OECD’s STAN database; (c) the investment is
financed fully by new shares issue; (d) personal taxation of interest in-
come, dividends and capital gains is not included; (e) the inflation rate
is the country-specific inflation rate reported each year by Eurostat; (f)
the nominal interest rate is the one-year interest rate on public bonds,
reported by the Bulletin of the European Central Bank; (g) the eco-
nomic depreciation rate is set equal to 12.5%; (h) the fiscal depreciation
rates are those reported, for each country and year, by the “Worldwide
Corporate Tax Guide” for plant and machinery. TAX–EATR–SQ is the
squared Effective Average Tax Rate.
Source: Authors’ computation on data from Ernst & Young’s “World-
wide Corporate Tax Guide,” Eurostat, ECB Bulletin, and OECD STAN
database.
TAX–EATR–LOCAL;
TAX–EATR–LOCAL–SQ
Definition: Computed as TAX–EATR but with the inclusion of local
and municipal taxes, and other supplementary charges. TAX–EATR–
LOCAL–SQ is the square of TAX–EATR–LOCAL.
Source: Authors’ computation on data from Ernst & Young’s “World-
wide Corporate Tax Guide,” Eurostat, ECB Bulletin, and OECD STAN
database.
TAX–EATR–DEBT;
TAX–EATR–DEBT–SQ
Definition: Computed as TAX–EATR but assuming that the investment
is financed fully by debt. TAX–EATR–DEBT–SQ is the square of TAX–
EATR–DEBT.
Source: Authors’ computation on data from Ernst & Young’s “World-
wide Corporate Tax Guide,” Eurostat, ECB Bulletin, and OECD STAN
database.
TAX–EATR–
PERSONAL;
TAX–EATR–
PERSONAL–SQ
Definition: Computed as TAX–EATR but including personal taxa-
tion. TAX–EATR–PERSONAL–SQ is the square of TAX–EATR–
PERSONAL.
Source: Authors’ computation on data from Ernst & Young’s “World-
wide Corporate Tax Guide,” and “The Global Executive Guide,” Euro-
stat, ECB Bulletin, and OECD STAN database.
CARRY–FWD Definition: Equals the number of years income losses can be carried
forward to future fiscal years for taxation purposes. When losses can be
carried forward indefinitely, we assign the maximum number observed
in the sample, equal to 15.
Source: Authors’ computation on data from Ernst & Young’s “World-
wide Corporate Tax Guide.”
CARRY–BACK Definition: Equals the number of years income losses can be used to
obtain a tax credit on taxes paied on past income (’carried back’).
Source: Authors’ computation on data from Ernst & Young’s “World-
wide Corporate Tax Guide.”
PRO-BUSINESS–
POLICY
Definition: It is the average of the nine policy factor scores built by the
Heritage Foundation. These include: business regulation, international
trade regulation, tax burden, extent of public ownership, price stabil-
ity, regulation of financial institutions, regulation of foreign investments,
quality of property rights and anti-corruption enforement. The index
ranges from 0 (minimum economic freedom) to 100 (maximum economic
freedom). Each component score is based on national and international
data, economic indicators, and opinions of a panel of academic advisors.
Source: Economic Freedom Index, published by the Heritage Foundation
and the Wall Street Journal (www.heritage.org), various years.
PERCEPTION–TAX Definition: Survey-based measure which answers the question: Do cor-
porate taxes discourage entrepreneurial activity? It ranges from 0 (the
tax system does not discourage entrepreneurial activity) to 10 (the tax
system discourages entrepreneurial activity).
Source: World Competitiveness Yearbook, published by the Interna-
tional Institute for Management Development (www.imd.ch/wcy), vari-
ous years.
ANTITRUST–
REGULATION
Definition: Survey-based measure which answers the question: Are an-
titrust laws efficient in preventing unfair competition? It ranges from
0 (no, antitrust laws do not prevent unfair competition) to 10 (yes, an-
titrust laws prevent unfair competition)
Source: World Competitiveness Yearbook, published by the Interna-
tional Institute for Management Development (www.imd.ch/wcy), vari-
ous years.
BUREAUCRACY Definition: Survey-based measure which answers the question: Does
bureaucracy hinder business development? It ranges from 0 (yes, bu-
reaucracy hinders business development) to 10 (no, bureaucracy does
not hinder business development)
Source: World Competitiveness Yearbook, published by the Interna-
tional Institute for Management Development (www.imd.ch/wcy), vari-
ous years.
CORRUPTION Definition: Survey-based measure which answers the question: Do im-
proper practices such as bribing or corruption prevail in the public
sphere? It ranges from 0 (yes, bribing or corruption prevail in the pub-
lic sphere) to 10 (no, bribing or corruption do not prevail in the public
sphere)
Source: World Competitiveness Yearbook, published by the Interna-
tional Institute for Management Development (www.imd.ch/wcy), vari-
ous years.
LABOUR–
REGULATION
Definition: Survey-based measure which answers the question: Do labor
regulations (hiring/firing practices, minimum wages, etc.) hinder busi-
ness activities? It ranges from 0 (yes, labor regulations hinder business
activities) to 10 (no, labor regulations do not hinder business activities)
Source: World Competitiveness Yearbook, published by the Interna-
tional Institute for Management Development (www.imd.ch/wcy), vari-
ous years.
ACCESS–CAPITAL Definition: Survey-based measure which answers the question: Are cap-
ital markets (foreign and domestic) easily accessible? It ranges from 0
(no, capital market are not accessible) to 10 (yes, capital market are
accessible)
Source: World Competitiveness Yearbook, published by the Interna-
tional Institute for Management Development (www.imd.ch/wcy), vari-
ous years.
ACCOUNTING–GOOD;
ACCOUNTING–BAD
Definition: ACCOUNTING–GOOD is a dummy variables that equals 1
for Finland, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, and the UK, and equals 0 for all other countries.
ACCOUNTING–BAD is a dummy variable that equals 1 for Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal, and
equals 0 for all other countries.
Source: LaPorta et al. (1998)
VETO–POWER Definition: It is a variable that counts the number of players with veto
power present in a political system; it is computed yearly. For presiden-
tial systems, it counts the number of players with veto power, considering
the executive and legislative powers separately only if they are controlled
by different parties. For parliamentary systems, it counts the number of
parties in the government coalition. The measure also takes into account
the effect that certain electoral rules (e.g., closed versus open list) have
on the cohesiveness of governing coalitions.
Source: World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions, described by
Beck et al. (2001).
GOV–STABILITY Definition: It is a survey-based measure assessing both the governments
ability to carry out its declared program, and its ability to stay in office.
It ranges from 0 (low stability) to 12 (high stability); it is computed
yearly.
Source: International Country Risk Guide, published by The PRS Group
Inc. (www.prsgroup.com), various years.
GOV–CENTER–LEFT Definition: It is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the chief executive
party is a center-left-wing party and 0 otherwise; it is computed yearly.
Source: World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions, described by
Beck et al. (2001).
GOV–
FRAGMENTATION
Definition: It is the Herfindahl index for a country’s political parties,
computed as the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the
parliament, and is computed yearly.
Source: World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions, described by
Beck et al. (2001).
ELECTION–DATE Definition: It is a dummy variable equal to one for all years when leg-
islative elections took place in a given country.
Source: The European parliamentary elections and political parties
database, www.parties-and-elections.de.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
This Table reports summary statistics for the sample of 17 EU countries observed over the
1997–2004 time period. Variables are defined in Table 1. PERCEPTION–TAX is missing
for 1997. For variables that do not vary over industries the descriptive statistics are reported
with respect to the country-year dimensions.
Variable Mean S.D. 25th perc. Median 75th perc. Observations
ENTRY–COUNTRY 8.27 5.07 5.47 8.08 10.11 134
ENTRY–COUNTRY–INDUSTRY 7.02 6.68 3.29 5.59 8.91 4,805
TAX–EATR 30.08 4.99 27.57 30.04 33.44 4,805
TAX–EATR–LOCAL 31.55 6.14 28.25 31.33 34.73 4,805
TAX–EATR–DEBT 26.67 5.83 23.89 27.03 30.49 4,805
TAX–EATR–PERSONAL 40.70 16.99 24.95 47.58 51.77 4,805
PRO–BUSINESS–POLICY 69.68 5.88 65.70 68.80 74.40 134
CARRY–FWD 10.66 4.34 6 10 15 134
CARRY–BACK 0.56 1.03 0 0 1 134
PERCEPTION–TAX 5.44 1.36 4.18 5.57 6.50 119
ANTRITRUST–REGULATION 6.38 0.88 5.70 6.45 7.00 134
BUREAUCRACY 3.96 1.52 2.68 3.88 5.33 134
CORRUPTION 6.39 2.01 5.09 6.79 7.84 134
LABOUR–REGULATION 4.36 1.61 3.15 4.05 5.20 134
ACCESS–CAPITAL 8.49 0.54 8.10 8.51 8.90 134
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Table 4. Main estimation results
This table presents our main results. The dependent variable is ENTRY–COUNTRY–INDUSTRY in
columns (1) and (2), and TAX–EATR in column (3). The independent variables are defined in Table
1. Column (1) reports results from the within-group regression. Column (2) reports results for the
GMM within-group regression where TAX–EATR and TAX–EATR–SQ are instrumented. Column
(3) presents the (pseudo) first stage regression corresponding to column (2). Time dummies are
included but not displayed. Standard errors (shown in parenthesis) are robust to heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation. The reported tests for instrument validity and relevancy are discussed in Section
6.2. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are marked with *, **, and ***. Estimates
are performed using the command xtivreg2 for Stata 10 by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007) and
Schaffer (2007).
(1) (2) (3)
WG GMM-IV FIRST-STAGE
TAX–EATR -0.886*** -3.417***
(0.16) (0.58)
TAX–EATR–SQ 0.015*** 0.053***
(0.00) (0.01)
PRO–BUSINESS–POLICY 0.127*** 0.057 -0.396***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
GOV–CENTER–LEFT -2.596***
(0.21)
VETO–POWER 0.622***
(0.07)
GOV–STABILITY -0.337***
(0.08)
ELECTION–DATE -0.541***
(0.08)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Wald test on regressors 94.47 78.88 380.06
degrees of freedom [p-value] 10 [0.00] 10 [0.00] 12 [0.00]
Wald test on time dummies 31.83 51.35 81.65
degrees of freedom [p-value] 7 [0.00] 7 [0.00] 7 [0.00]
Hansen J Statistic 3.31
degrees of freedom [p-value] 2 [0.19]
Endogeneity Test (Hansen C Statistic) 0.50
degrees of freedom [p-value] 1 [0.48]
Cragg-Donald Statistic 29.91
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 20.07
Observations 4,805 4,805 4,805
Table 5. Estimation results including tax provisions for new businesses
This table presents additional results where we include taxation provisions for new businesses. The
dependent variable is ENTRY–COUNTRY–INDUSTRY. The independent variables are defined in
Table 1. Column (1) reports results from the within-group regression, column (2) reports results for
the GMM within-group regression where TAX–EATR, TAX–EATR–SQ, CARRY–FWD and CARRY–
BACK are instrumented (the equation is exactly identified). Time dummies are included but not
displayed. Standard errors (shown in parenthesis) are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
The reported tests for instrument validity and relevancy are discussed in Section 6.2. Coefficients
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are marked with *, **, and ***. Estimates are performed
using the command xtivreg2 for Stata 10 by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007) and Schaffer (2007).
(1) (2)
WG GMM-IV
TAX–EATR -0.717*** -3.739***
(0.19) (0.72)
TAX–EATR–SQ 0.011*** 0.063***
(0.00) (0.01)
PRO–BUSINESS–POLICY 0.116*** 0.066
(0.04) (0.05)
CARRY–FWD 0.089 0.428*
(0.08) (0.24)
CARRY–BACK 1.967** -7.687
(0.88) (6.08)
Time dummies Yes Yes
Wald test on regressors 128.68 80.73
degrees of freedom [p-value] 12 [0.00] 12 [0.00]
Wald test on time dummies 27.37 40.56
degrees of freedom [p-value] 7 [0.00] 7 [0.00]
Hansen J Statistic –
degrees of freedom [p-value]
Endogeneity Test (Hansen C Statistic) –
degrees of freedom [p-value]
Cragg-Donald Statistic 15.39
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 26.11
Observations 4,805 4,805
Table 6. Estimation results controlling for additional policy dimensions
This table presents results for additional policy dimensions. The dependent variable is ENTRY–
COUNTRY–INDUSTRY. The independent variables are defined in Table 1. All columns report results
for the GMM within-group regression where TAX–EATR and TAX–EATR–SQ are instrumented.
Time dummies are included but not displayed. Standard errors (shown in parenthesis) are robust to
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The reported tests for instrument validity and relevancy are
discussed in Section 6.2. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are marked with *, **,
and ***. Estimates are performed using the command xtivreg2 for Stata 10 by Baum, Schaffer and
Stillman (2007) and Schaffer (2007).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GMM-IV GMM-IV GMM-IV GMM-IV GMM-IV
TAX–EATR -3.615*** -3.039*** -3.286*** -3.060*** -3.510***
(0.57) (0.45) (0.43) (0.50) (0.57)
TAX–EATR–SQ 0.056*** 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.054***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ANTRITRUST–REGULATION 0.158
(0.23)
BUREAUCRACY 0.734***
(0.17)
CORRUPTION 0.463***
(0.17)
LABOUR–REGULATION 0.334*
(0.18)
ACCESS–CAPITAL 0.429
(0.36)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald test on regressors 73.12 81.57 97.08 77.35 90.25
degrees of freedom [p-value] 10 [0.00] 10 [0.00] 10 [0.00] 10 [0.00] 10 [0.00]
Wald test on time dummies 50.28 47.84 52.22 46.28 48.27
degrees of freedom [p-value] 7 [0.00] 7 [0.00] 7 [0.00] 7 [0.00] 7 [0.00]
Hansen J Statistic 3.16 0.60 0.98 2.90 3.12
degrees of freedom [p-value] 2 [0.21] 2 [0.74] 2 [0.61] 2 [0.23] 2 [0.21]
Endogeneity Test (Hansen C Statistic) 3.01 0.60 0.39 2.76 1.99
degrees of freedom [p-value] 1 [0.08] 1 [0.44] 1 [0.53] 1 [0.10] 1 [0.16]
Cragg-Donald Statistic 32.45 54.39 67.07 42.60 32.23
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 20.55 25.65 29.70 29.05 19.15
Observations 4,805 4,805 4,805 4,805 4,805
Table 7. Estimation results controlling for the quality of accounting standards
This table presents results where we distinguish between countries with above average and below average
quality of accounting standards. The dependent variable is ENTRY–COUNTRY–INDUSTRY in columns
(1) and (2), TAX–EATR?ACCOUNTING–GOOD in column (3), and TAX–EATR?ACCOUNTING–BAD
in column (4). The independent variables are defined in Table 1. Column (1) reports results from the
within-group regression, column (2) reports results for the GMM within-group regression where TAX–EATR
and TAX–EATR–SQ are instrumented, while columns (3) and (4) present the pseudo first stage regressions
corresponding to column (2). Time dummies are included but not displayed. Standard errors (shown in
parenthesis) are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and
1% level are marked with *, **, and ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WG GMM-IV FIRST-STAGE FIRST-STAGE
ACCOUNT.–GOOD ACCOUNT.–BAD
TAX–EATR?ACCOUNTING–GOOD -0.647 -7.480***
(0.40) (2.11)
TAX–EATR?ACCOUNTING–BAD -0.905*** -3.043***
(0.18) (0.46)
(TAX–EATR?ACCOUNTING–GOOD)–SQ 0.010 0.132***
(0.01) (0.03)
(TAX–EATR?ACCOUNTING–BAD)–SQ 0.015*** 0.049***
(0.00) (0.01)
PRO–BUSINESS–POLICY 0.125*** 0.137*** -0.034*** -0.308***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
GOV–CENTER–LEFT?ACCOUNTING–GOOD -0.465*** -0.989***
(0.11) (0.10)
VETO–POWER?ACCOUNTING–GOOD -0.097** 0.154***
(0.04) (0.05)
GOV–STABILITY?ACCOUNTING–GOOD 0.212*** -0.244***
(0.04) (0.05)
ELECTION–DATE?ACCOUNTING–GOOD 0.289*** 0.135**
(0.05) (0.06)
GOV–CENTER–LEFT?ACCOUNTING–BAD 0.134*** -3.830***
(0.03) (0.27)
VETO–POWER?ACCOUNTING–BAD 0.330*** 1.109***
(0.02) (0.11)
GOV–STABILITY?ACCOUNTING–BAD 0.082*** -0.736***
(0.02) (0.10)
ELECTION–DATE?ACCOUNTING–BAD -0.113*** -1.337***
(0.03) (0.12)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald test on regressors 103.29 140.46 540.12 645.66
degrees of freedom [p-value] 12 [0.00] 12 [0.00] 16 [0.00] 16 [0.00]
Wald test on time dummies 30.39 56.06 466.20 254.37
degrees of freedom [p-value] 7 [0.00] 7 [0.31] 7 [0.08] 7 [0.08]
Hansen J Statistic 2.64
degrees of freedom [p-value] 4 [0.62]
Endogeneity Test (Hansen C Statistic) 0.10
degrees of freedom [p-value] 1 [0.75]
Cragg-Donald Statistic 7.51
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 9.56
Observations 4,805 4,805 4,805 4,805
Table 8. Estimation results using alternative tax measures
This table presents results for alternative tax measures. The dependent variable is ENTRY–
COUNTRY–INDUSTRY in columns (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), and (8), and TAX–EATR in
columns (3), (6), and (9). The independent variables are defined in Table 1. Columns
(1), (4), and (7) report results from the within-group regression, columns (2), (5), and (8)
report results for the GMM within-group regression where TAX–EATR and TAX–EATR–
SQ are instrumented, while columns (3), (6), and (9) present the corresponding pseudo first
stage regressions. Time dummies are included but not displayed. Standard errors (shown
in parenthesis) are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The reported tests for
instrument validity and relevancy are discussed in Section 6.2. Coefficients significant at the
10%, 5% and 1% level are marked with *, **, and ***. Estimates are performed using the
command xtivreg2 for Stata 10 by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007) and Schaffer (2007).
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Table 9. Robustness: Estimation results for taxation perception
This table presents results for an alternative qualitative tax measure. The dependent variable is
ENTRY–COUNTRY–INDUSTRY in columns (1) and (2), and PERCEPTION–TAX in column (3).
The independent variables are defined in Table 1. Column (1) reports results from the within-group
regression, column (2) reports results for the GMM within-group regression where PERCEPTION–
TAX is instrumented, while column (3) presents the pseudo first stage regression corresponding to
column (2). Time dummies are included but not displayed. Standard errors (shown in parenthesis)
are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The reported tests for instrument validity and
relevancy are discussed in Section 6.2. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are marked
with *, **, and ***. Estimates are performed using the command xtivreg2 for Stata 10 by Baum,
Schaffer and Stillman (2007) and Schaffer (2007).
(1) (2) (3)
WG GMM-IV FIRST-STAGE
PERCEPTION–TAX -0.353*** -1.335***
(0.13) (0.33)
PRO–BUSINESS–POLICY 0.102** 0.011 -0.068***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
GOV–CENTER–LEFT 0.082***
(0.03)
VETO–POWER 0.184***
(0.01)
GOV–STABILITY -0.200***
(0.01)
ELECTION–DATE 0.005
(0.02)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Wald test on regressors 40.33 39.47 5071.99
degrees of freedom [p-value] 7 [0.00] 7 [0.00] 10 [0.00]
Wald test on time dummies 28.50 31.56 1582.20
degrees of freedom [p-value] 5 [0.00] 5 [0.00] 5 [0.00]
Hansen J Statistic 47.94
degrees of freedom [p-value] 3 [0.00]
Endogeneity Test (Hansen C Statistic) 0.75
degrees of freedom [p-value] 1 [0.39]
Cragg-Donald Statistic 158.25
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 190.07
Observations 3,727 3,727 3,727
Table 10. Robustness: Estimation results when
PRO–BUSINESS–POLICY is instrumented
This table presents results where both the tax measures and the PRO–BUSINESS–POLICY index
are instrumented. The dependent variable is ENTRY–COUNTRY–INDUSTRY in column (1), TAX–
EATR in column (2), and PRO-BUSINESS–POLICY in column (3). The independent variables
are defined in Table 1. Column (1) reports results for the GMM within-group regression where
TAX–EATR, TAX–EATR–SQ, and PRO–BUSINESS–POLICY are instrumented, while columns (2)
and (3) present the pseudo first stage regressions corresponding to column (2). Time dummies are
included but not displayed. Standard errors (shown in parenthesis) are robust to heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation. The reported tests for instrument validity and relevancy are discussed in Section
6.2. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are marked with *, **, and ***. Estimates
are performed using the command xtivreg2 for Stata 10 by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007) and
Schaffer (2007).
(1) (2) (3)
GMM-IV FIRST-STAGE FIRST-STAGE
TAX–EATR PRO-BUSIN.-POLICY
TAX–EATR -2.987***
(0.81)
TAX–EATR–SQ 0.046***
(0.01)
PRO–BUSINESS–POLICY 0.231
(0.25)
GOV–CENTER–LEFT -2.420*** -0.444***
(0.22) (0.12)
VETO–POWER 0.512*** 0.278***
(0.06) (0.05)
GOV–STABILITY -0.518*** 0.457***
(0.08) (0.05)
ELECTION–DATE -0.370*** -0.432***
(0.08) (0.06)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Wald test on regressors 77.10 228.64 972.48
degrees of freedom [p-value] 10 [0.00] 11 [0.00] 11 [0.00]
Wald test on time dummies 50.90 122.17 782.41
degrees of freedom [p-value] 7 [0.00] 7 [0.31] 7 [0.08]
Hansen J Statistic 2.83
degrees of freedom [p-value] 2 [0.00]
Endogeneity Test (Hansen C Statistic) 0.50
degrees of freedom [p-value] 1 [0.48]
Cragg-Donald Statistic 9.03
Kleibergen-Paap Statistic 12.76
Observations 4,805 4,805 4,805
a) Entry rates by country
b) Entry rates by country–industry
Figure 1: Entry rates by country and by country–industry (averaged over countries)
Figure 2: Effective tax rates (averaged over countries)
Figure 3: PRO–BUSINESS–POLICY scores (averaged over countries)
Appendix
Table A1. Entry Dataset Construction
This Table reports the criteria used in the construction of the entry dataset, which follows
those of Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006).
COUNTRIES
Included Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom.
LEGAL FORMS
Included: Corporations, e.g., AG, SA, NV, A/S, Plc, OYJ, AE, SpA, AB.
Limited Liability Companies, e.g., GmbH, SPRL, BVBA, ApS, Ltd, OY,
SARL, EPE, Srl, BV, A/S, LDA, SL.
Excluded: Other legal forms: sole proprietorships, cooperatives, partnerships.
INDUSTRIES (2-DIGIT NACE CODE LEVEL)
Included:
Manufacturing D: 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33,
34, 35, 36
Electricity, gas, water supply E: 40, 41
Construction F: 45
Wholesale and retail trade G: 50, 51, 52
Hotels and restaurants H: 55
Transport, storage, telecom I: 60, 61, 62, 63, 64
Real estate, rental, bus. serv. K: 70, 71, 72, 73, 74
Excluded:
Agriculture A: 01, 02
Fishing B: 05
Mining C: 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
Manufacturing D: 37
Financial intermediation J: 65, 66, 67
Public Administration L: 75
Education M: 80
Health and social work N: 85
Other social and pers. serv. O: 90, 91, 92, 93)
Activities of households P: 95, 97
Extra-territorial organiz. Q: 99
CONSOLIDATION CODES
Included:
C1 Consolidated statement without an unconsolidated companion
U1 Unconsolidated statement without a consolidated companion
U2 Unconsolidated statement with a consolidated companion
LF Limited financial data, probably unconsolidated
NA Not available
Excluded:
C2 Consolidated statement with an unconsolidated companion
Computation of the effective average tax rate
The most general formula for EATR is (see Table A2 for variables’ definitions):
EATR =
R∗ −R
R∗
(1)
In the denominator we substitute R∗, which can potentially be equal to zero, with the net
present value of pre-tax income, obtaining the following formula, that we apply to our data:
EATR =
R∗ −R
p
1+r
(2)
where p is the financial return rate on the investment, r is the real interest rate, and:
R∗ =
p− r
1 + r
(3)
R =
γ
(1 + ρ)
{(p+ δ)(1 + pi)(1− τ)− [(1 + ρ)− (1− δ)(1 + pi)](1−A)}+ F (4)
ρ =
(1−mi)i
(1− z) (5)
γ =
(1−md)(1− c)
(1− s)(1− z) (6)
A =

φτ
(1 + ρ)
ρ
[
1− 1
(1 + ρ)T+1
]
with straight line depreciation, for T = 1/φ
φτ(1 + ρ)
ρ+ φ
with depreciation on a declining balance basis
(7)
and
F =

FRE = 0 if the project is financed by retained earnings
FNE =
−ρ(1− γ)
1 + ρ
(1− φτ) if the project is financed by new equity
FDE =
γ(1− φτ)
1 + ρ
[ρ− i(1− τ)] if the project is financed by debt
(8)
The TAX–EATR measures we employ in the paper are then obtained under the following
assumptions:
• TAX–EATR assumes that all personal tax rates equal zero (mi = md = c = s = z = 0)
and that the project is financed by new equity (F = FNE);
• TAX–EATR–LOCAL employs a measure of corporate taxation (τ) that includes local
or municipal taxes and other charges. It assumes that all personal tax rates equal zero
(mi = md = c = s = z = 0) and that the project is financed by issuing new equity
(F = FNE);
• TAX–EATR–DEBT assumes that all personal tax rates equal zero (mi = md = c =
s = z = 0) and that the project is financed by debt (F = FDE);
• TAX–EATR-PERSONAL: includes personal taxation, assuming that the project is fi-
nanced by new equity (F = FNE).
Table A2. Variables used to compute effective average tax
rates
This Table reports the definitions and sources for the variables used for the computation of
TAX–EATR, following Chennells and Griffith (1997), Devereux and Griffith (1998b), and
European Commission (2001).
VARIABLE DEFINITION AND SOURCES
τ Definition: The statutory corporate income tax rate. In the baseline specifi-
cation it does not include local or municipal taxes.
Source: “Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide” by Ernst & Young.
mi Definition: The personal tax rate on interest income is the after-witholding
tax rate on interest income from savings (e.g. bank accounts and deposits)
and investments (e.g. bonds and securities). When rates on savings and
investments differ, the maximum tax rate on investments is considered. In the
computation we use the maximum marginal tax rate for a domestic resident.
Source: “The Global Executive” tax guide by Ernst & Young.
md Definition: The personal tax rate on dividend income is the after-witholding
maximum tax rate on dividends. We consider the final maximum tax rate for
a resident qualified shareholder. The definition of a qualified or substantial
participation differs across the national jurisdictions and over time.
Source: “The Global Executive” tax guide by Ernst & Young.
s Definition: The rate of tax credit available on dividends, expressed as a pro-
portion of gross dividends. It is available in the countries that adopt an im-
putation system where a share of corporate income taxes paid on distributed
profits can be offset against personal income tax liabilities.
Source: “The Global Executive” tax guide by Ernst & Young.
c Definition: The rate of withholding tax on dividends paid by the firm to the
shareholder.
Source: “Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide” by Ernst & Young.
z Definition: A shareholder’s marginal personal capital gains tax rate. This is
the tax rate on capital gains from the disposal of shares. We consider the
marginal tax rate for a shareholder with a qualified participation in the cor-
poration. The definition of a qualified participation differs across the national
jurisdictions and over time. We use the maximum marginal tax rate for a
domestic resident.
Source: “The Global Executive” tax guide by Ernst & Young.
i Definition: The nominal interest rate, equal to the rate on one-year govern-
ment bonds.
Source: European Central Bank Monthly Bulletin.
φ Definition: The rate at which capital expenditure can be offset against taxes.
In the baseline specification we use the maximum allowed fiscal depreciation
rate for plant and machinery.
Source: “Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide” by Ernst & Young.
pi Definition: The inflation rate, common to output and capital, given by the
nominal increase in prices between periods t and t+ 1.
Source: Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs) by Eurostat.
p Definition: The financial rate of return on the investment. This profitability
rate is computed for each industry-year pair in the US as: (Total Value Added
– Total Labor Cost)/Total Value Added.
Source: OECD STAN database for Industrial Analysis.
r Definition: The real interest rate, (1 + r)(1 + pi) = (1 + i).
Source: Authors’ coalculation.
δ Definition: One period cost of depreciation. It is assumed equal to 12.5%.
Source: Devereux, Griffith and Klemme (2002) and Yoo (2003).
A Definition: The net present value of tax allowances per unit of investment.
The cost of one unit of physical investment in period t is therefore (1−A).
Source: Authors’ computation (see equation (7) above).
ρ Definition: Shareholders’ nominal discount rate.
Source: Authors’ computation (see equation (5) above).
γ Definition: This parameter measures the tax wedge between the taxation of
capital gains and dividends.
Source: Authors’ computation (see equation (6) above).
R Definition: The after-tax net present value of the investment. It equals the
net present value of earnings: Rt = (1 + ρ)dVt = dDt − dNt + dVt+1. Her
dDt and dNt are the changes in dividends and new equity issues in period t,
respectively. Vt is the value of the firm in period t, that equals the net present
value of after-tax earnings, and is given by: Vt = [γDt−Nt+Vt+1]/(1+ρ). Rt
consists of two parts: Rt = RREt + Ft; where R
RE
t is the income attributable
to the investment financed by retained earnings, while Ft is the additional cost
of raising external finance
Source: Authors’ computation (see equation (4) above).
R∗ Definition: The pre-tax value of the investment. It is equal to R∗t = R∗REt +F ∗t ;
where F ∗t = 0, because the net present value of the additional costs due to
financing by new equity or debt is zero, while R∗REt can be simplified to
R∗REt = (p− r)/(1 + r), since in absence of taxes τ = A = 0 and γ = 1; ρ = i
Source: Authors’ computation (see equation (3) above).
F Definition: The cost of raising external finance.
Source: Authors’ computation (see equation (8) above).
p˜ Definition: The internal rate of return to the project, obtained setting R = 0
and solving for p in equation (4).
Source: Authors’ computation (see equation (4) above).
EATR Definition: It is the proportional difference between R∗t and Rt. It is defined
for p ≥ p˜.
Source: Authors’ computation (see equation (2) above).
Table A3. Descriptive statistics for the variables used to
compute TAX–EATR
This Table reports summary statistics for the 17 EU countries observed over the 1997–2004
time period. Variables are defined in Table A2, and are expressed in percentage terms.
Variable Mean S.D. 25th perc. Median 75th perc. Observations
τ 31.77 5.08 28.00 33.00 35.00 134
mi 35.86 14.13 25.00 32.50 48.00 134
md 31.99 15.65 25.00 30.00 45.00 134
s 11.65 15.81 0.00 0.00 29.00 134
c 26.88 13.60 20.00 27.00 35.00 134
z 21.91 9.67 20.00 25.00 28.00 134
i 3.69 1.63 2.36 3.45 4.26 134
φ 18.84 6.62 15.00 20.00 20.00 134
pi 2.05 1.07 1.30 2.00 2.60 134
p 41.33 19.46 30.15 36.00 47.10 320
